Case Notes by Maurer, Barbara A. & Schenke, L. Diane
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-PUBLIC SCHOOL
MATERNITY LEAvE-Cler'eland Board of Edhcation v, LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974).
In late 1970, two Cleveland, Ohio public school teachers and one Chester-
field County, Virginia, public school teacher learned that they were pregnant and
told their principals that they intended to teach until the end of the school term.1
However, their principals informed them that school board rules required them to
take a mandatory maternity leave without pay beginning at a cut-off date early in
pregnancy2 until at least the commencement of the school term following child-
birth.3 These rules resulted in enforced leaves lasting from six months to over a
year and a half without pay. Neither school board contemplated that the pregnant
teachers would return to their same classroom; the boards used permanent replace.
ments, rather than temporary substitutes in the pregnant teachers' classrooms,
4
Furthermore, the Chesterfield County board dismissed teachers who did not take
the Board's first offer of a position upon their return, 5 while the Cleveland board
dismissed teachers who failed to follow the maternity rules.0 The school teachers
1 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 636, 638 (1974). LaFleur and Nelson
expected their children in the summer of 1971; Cohen expected her child in April and asked
to teach until April 1 or until the end of the first semester.
2The Cleveland rules required leave to be taken five months before the expected date of
birth. See note 6 infra. The Chesterfield County rules set a leave date of four months before
the expected date of birth. See note 5 infra.
3 The Cleveland rules prohibited teachers from returning until the school semester begin-
ning after the child reached three months of age This resulted in at least an eight month leave.
See note 6 infra. The Chesterfield rule prohibited return until the beginning of the school
year following childbirth. See note 5 infra.
4 The school board policy suggests permanent replacements would be used. In actuality,
Cleveland replaced LaFleur with a student intern in her special classes. See Respondent's Brief,
Appendix, 74a, 54a. The Cleveland rules require two weeks notice before leave is taken, leav-
ing little time for finding a suitable permanent replacement. See note 6 infra
5 The Chesterfield County rule provides:
MATERNITY PROVISIONS
a. Notice in writing must be given to the School Board at least six (6) months prior
to the date of expected birth.
b. Termination of employment of an expectant mother shall become effective at
least four (4) months prior to the expected birth of the child. Termination of
employment may be extended if the superintendent receives written recommenda-
tions from the expectant mother's physician and her principal, and if the superinten.
dent feels that an extension will be in the best interest of the pupils and school in.
volved.
c. Maternity Leave
(1) Maternity leave must be requested in writing at the time of termination
of employment.
(2) Maternity leave will be granted only to those persons who have a record
of satisfactory performance.
(3) An individual will be declared eligible for re-employment when she sub.
mits written notice from her physician that she is physically fit for full-time employ-
ment and when she can give full assurance that care for the child will cause minimal
interference with job responsibilities.
(4) Re-employment will be guaranteed no later than the first day of the school
year following the date that the individual was declared eligible for re-employment.
414 U.S. at 637, n. 5.
The Cleveland rule provides:
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believed that the personal, financial, and professional burdens placed upon them by
the mandatory leave policies deprived them of constitutionally protected rights;
they subsequently filed suits in federal courts.7
The circuit courts found that the suits raised the question of whether the school
boards' maternity leave rules constituted a violation of the equal protection dause
of the fourteenth amendment.3 The majority of the United States Supreme Court,
however, found that certain provisions of the rules violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.9 The Supreme Court decision has been analyzed
in terms of substantive due process.10  This note will suggest, however, that the
Any married teacher who becomes pregnant and who desires to return to the employ
of the Board at a future date may be granted a maternity leave of absence without pay.
APPLICATION. A maternizy leave of absence shall be effective not less than five
(5) months before the expected date of the normal birth of the child. Application
for such leave shall be forwarded to the Superintendent at least two (2) weeks before
the effective date of the leave of absence. A leave of absence without pay shall be
granted by the Superintendent for a period not to exceed two (2) years.
REASSIGNMENT. A teacher may return to service from maternity leaves not earlier
than the beginning of the regular school semester which follows the child's age of
three (3) months. In unusual circumstances, exceptions to this requirement may be
made by the Superintendent with the approval of the Board. Written request for
return to service from maternity leave must reach the Superintendent at least six (6)
weeks prior to the beginning of the semester when the teacher expects to resume teach-
ing and shall be accompanied by a doctor's certificate stating the health and physical
condition of the teacher. The Superintendent may require an additional physical
examination.
When a teacher qualifies to remurn from maternity leave, she shall have priority in re-
assignment to a vacancy for which she is qualified under her certificate, but she shall
nor have prior claim to the exact position she held before the leave of absence became
effective.
A teacher's failure to follow the above rules for maternity leave of absence shall he
construed as termination of contract or as grounds for dismissal. (Emphasis in orig-
inal.)
414 U.S. at 635, n. 1.
7LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (ED. Va. 1971).
8 LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Cohen v. Chester-
field County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973). See note 7 supra for district court
opinions.
In addition, other courts had rendered decisions on maternity leave provisions, usually on
equal protection grounds. Compare Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cr.
1973) (invalidating mandatory leave rules for pregnant public school teachers) with Schatt-
man v. Texas Employment Commission, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding a leave policy
of a state agency).
For opinions of the district courts dealing with mandatory maternity leaves, see e.g., Heath
v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Pocklington v. Duval County
School Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Bravo v. Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D.
Ill. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified Schcol Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. CaL 1972).
Cf. Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp.
37 (D. Colo. 1972) (all dealing with Air Force regulations requiring separation of pregnant
ptrsonnel); Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 409
U.S. 947, vacated and remanded to consider the issue of mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
9 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
10 Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee--
Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. LJ 1071, 1107 (1974) Eherein-
after referred to as Nowak] : "Procedural language cannot disguise the fact that the Court re-
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decision is based on procedural due process and that the safeguards afforded by
that analysis fail to protect adequately the constitutional rights of the teachers. In
addition, this note will examine the equal protection arguments presented to the
Court and will suggest possible reasons that the Court did not discuss and apply
them. The note concludes that the decision results in unequal treatment for preg-
nant teachers compared to other disabled teachers required to take leave. The
protection accorded to pregnant teachers by the Court's decision is less satisfactory
than that which might have resulted from a decision based upon the equal protec-
tion dause.
II. DuE PROCESS ANALYSIS
A. Historical Backgroutnd
The Supreme Court's early interpretations construed the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment narrowly n By the turn of the century, however, the
Court had decided that it had authority to judge the reasonableness of state eco-
nomic legislation on the basis of judicially noticed facts.1 2 The Court's determi-
nation that the due process clause entitled persons who were deprived of property
by state laws13 to a'judicial hearing resulted in extensive judicial determinations
of rates 14 and in sweeping invalidation of state legislation under a broad defini-
tion of constitutionally protected liberties.15 These decisions are broadly defined
as determinations of substantive due process.10 The apogee of this trend was
Lochner v. New York,17 in which the Court invalidated a New York law fixing
viewed the substance of the rules involved, not merely the manner in which they were en-
forced."
11 See the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1877).
12 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). The Court stated:
The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pie-
tences. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn duty-to look at the sub-
stance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has
transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been
enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no
real or substantial relation to thoie objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured
by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.
13See Chicago, M. and Sr. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). In this case, the
Court held unconstitutional a state statute authorizing a commission to set railroad rates and
forbidding any judicial review of the rates set.
14 Cf. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898).
15See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). The court described the broad
scope of the meaning of liberty in the due process clause:
[It] means not only the right of the citizen to be free from mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all of his faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a suc-
cessful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
1' Railway Express Agency v. New York, 3 36 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1919).
17 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). In his dissent, Justice Holmes objected to the Court's enact-
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baker's hours at sixty hours a week on the ground that it interfered with the gen-
eral right to make a contract, part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
fourteenth amendment.3s
In the 1930's the Court retreated from its position that the due process clause
permitted it to examine the reasonableness of state economic legislationg and, for
a variety of reasons,20 granted a presumption of validity to state legislation, shift-
ing the burden of proof from the state to the claimant." '2 The Court upheld state
regulation of prices, 2 2 maximum hours and minimum wages for men,23 women,
and children,2 4 discrimination in hiring and firing,"'5 and other regulation of busi-
ness and economics.2 6 In general, due process decisions were limited to an exam-
ination of the criminal procedural guarantees- 7 and Supreme Court activity under
the fourteenth amendment shifted to an examination of equal protection daims.28
Some recent Supreme Court decisions have been regarded as a revival of sub-




9 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). The Court stated:
So far as due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restric-
tion, a sta:e is free to adopt whatever economic policy may be reasonably deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its pur-
pose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is de-
clared by the legislature, to override it.
20 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). Upholding minimum
wages for women and minors, the Court sta'ed "We may take judicial notice of the unparalleled
demands for relief which arose during the recent period of depression.... What these workers
lose in wages, the taxpayers are called upon to pay."
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). Retreating from consideration of a New
York statu:e setting minimum and maximum prices on milk, the Court demurred, 'With the
wisdom of the [economic) policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law en-
acted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal."
2
1 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938):
Even in the absence of such aids [as legislative findings in reports of committees]
the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regu-
latory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
'"Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
23 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
"'4 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908).
25Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941). These cases prevented discrimina-
tion by employers for union membership or for failure to acquire such membership.
2 6 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
2 7 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the due process clause requires in-
clusion of the fourth amendment search and seizure protections and the federal exclusionary
rule); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (established that the due process clause did
not require incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights, but only the rights which are of "the
very essence of ordered liberty").
2
8 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trines on a Changing Court: A fodel for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REV. 1, 17
(1972) [hereinafter referred to as Gunther).
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stantive due process, albeit not in the area of economics and business. In these
cases, the Court has been willing to examine the reasonableness of legislation
where it finds an infringement upon or a deprivation of a fundamental constitu-
tional liberty. 29 The pre-1930's due process decisions of Pierce v. Society of Ss.
ters,30 Meyer v. Nebraska,31 and Prince v. Massachusellj82 established a fundamen.
tal liberty of parents to decide how to bring up and educate their children. These
cases were relied on in recent Supreme Court decisions which extended the defi-
nition of family rights. In Griswold v. Connecticut,83 Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 4 and
Roe v. Wade,35 the Court defined a constitutionally protected individual rijht to
privacy in deciding whether or not to bear or beget children,
The LaFleur Court cited all these decisions for the proposition that "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life" is a liberty protected by
the due process clause.3 6 The Court's reliance on such sources has been viewed as
supporting the contention that the Court is again reviving substantive due process
in LaFleur.3 7
29 See Nowak, supra note 10, at 1089, 1104.
30268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (invalidating state statutes requiring attendance at public
schools on grounds that it interferes with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control).
31262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting the teaching of
any modern language to children in private or public schools on grounds it interfered, with-
out a reasonable basis, with the occupation of modern language teachers, the pupils' opportuni-
ties to acquire knowledge, and the parents' control of the education of their own children, all
liberties protected by the due process clause).
32 321 U.S. 158 (1943) (upholding a state statute regulating child labor as applied to a
mother who took her child out at night to deliver religious pamphlets, the Court found a par.
ent's right to bring up a child could be limited by the state's right to safeguard the child's wel-
fare).
33 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state laws prohibiting the use and sale of contracep-
tives on the ground that the laws infringed on the rights to association and marital privacy
guaranteed by the ninth amendment).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan, discussed the effect of upholding a law prohibiting birth control in language relevant
to LaFleur:
While it may shock some of my Brethren that the Court tcday holds that the Con.
stitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking
to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include
protection against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete vari.
ance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of
rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then,
by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to
be valid. In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon
rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected. Id. at 497.
.34 405 U.S. 438, 453 (19"2). The Court upheld the right of a single woman to buy con-
traceptives on the ground that there is a constitutional right "to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."
35410 U.S. 133 (1973) (invalidating anti-abortion statutes and restrictive procedures on
grounds that the court must apply strict scrutiny where it recognizes a right to personal pri-
vacy in activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and in the upbringing and
education of children; this right to privacy is guaranteed by the ninth amendment and found
in the penumbra of other amendments).
36 414 U.S. at 639-40.
3t Nowak, supra note 10, at 1107.
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However, the Court has recently decided cases which essentially are limited
to an examination of procedural due process afforded in a noncriminal context
by both judicial and administrative bodies. In these decisions, the Court limits
its examination to the fairness of the procedure provided by government when it
deprives an individual of tangible goods,3 8 salary,3 9 or jobs.40 As win be shown,
LaFleur does not attack the substance of the maternity leave rule; rather, it grants
the school boards the right to require mandatory maternity leave.41 Furthermore,
it does not question the boards' characterization and treatment of maternity leave
as qualitatively different from leave for other disabilities. Unless the early cut-off
date and the delayed return constitute the entire substance of maternity leave, the
Court's decision seems to be limited to examining the procedure for determining
the appropriate time for the commencement of maternity leave.
B. The Due Process Analysis in LaFleur
1. Protected Property and Liberties
In its analysis of maternity leave rules, the Court followed, for the most part,
the guidelines outlined in Board of Regents of State College v. Roth42 for deter-
mining whether constitutional requirements for procedural due process have been
met in government employment. The Court also drew on the more recent proce-
dural due process cases of Stanley' v. Illinois43 and Vlandis v. Kline,4 4 for the
concept of irrebutable presumptions.
In Roth, the Supreme Court established the degree to which the due process
clause protects the rights of teachers and other public employees to employment.
Roth was a first-year college teacher on a one-year contract who was not rehired for
the following year. His contract did not require a hearing before termination, but
the Supreme Court found that this was not a violation of Roth's procedural
rights.45 The Court constructed a two-step analysis of procedural due process.
First, a determination must be made of whether due process requirements apply
in a particular case. Since these requirements apply only to interests encompassed
by the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property, it is only upon
denial of such protected interests that the employee has a right to some kind of
prior hearing. Second, once it is determined that due process requirements do
3 8 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (limiting the seizure of household goods under
a writ of replevin by suggesting that fair notice and hearing are required); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971) (continued possession of a driver's licene may become essential in pursuit
of a livelihood; such an entitlement, whether a right or privilege, is rot to be taken away
without procedural due process).
39 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (entitlement to public assistance is a property
right requiring a fair hearing before being terminated or reduced); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (requiring notice and preliminary hearing before garnishment of
wages).
40 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (some form of hearing
is required where governmental employment is terminated in a manner which infringes on
fundamental liberties).
41414 U.S. at 641-43.
42408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
43405 U.S. 645 (1972).
44 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
45408 U.S. at 578.
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apply, the individual interests of the employee and the public interests of the
governmental body may be balanced to determine the form of hearing constitution-
ally required.
46
The Roth Court confirmed that the due process clause protects property as
well as liberty. However, the Court displayed its continued reluctance to interfere
with state regulation of economic matters by severely limiting the degree to which
property rights can be judicially determined. Constitutional protection extends only
to those property interests to which a person holds a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment. A property interest is not created by the Constitution; rather, it is de-
fined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source,
such as state law, and which secure certain benefits and support claims of entitle-
ment to those benefits.47 The Court held that Roth's property interests were de-
fined by the terms of his contract, and that contract made no provision either for
renewal or for a hearing prior to expiration. 4
8
Like those in Roth, the property interests of the school teachers in LaFlur
were defined and limited by their contracts and by the mandatory maternity leave
rules promulgated by the school boards. The teachers had no claims to employ-
ment after the early cut-off date established by the boards until after the birth of
their children. Thus, there was no deprivation of the teachers' property interests
under the due process clause and the LaFleur Court did nol: suggest that there was.
The liberties protected by the due process clause have not been defined with
exactness, but the Roth Court did find that previous cases had determined that
some liberties were clearly within the scope of the clause.49 Liberty denotes not
merely freedom from bodily constraint, but also the right of the individual to
marry, to establish a home, and to bring up children.50 Because the Court found
that Roth had suffered no defamation of name and no infringement of his first
amendment right to freedom of speech, he did not have a substantial interest
requiring an opportunity for fair notice and a hearing.5'
In LaFleur, however, the Court established that teachers had been deprived
of liberties encompassed by the fourteenth amendment and were, therefore, en-
titled to a more particularized determination of the date for beginning and end-
ing their mandatory maternity leaves.52 Freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life, and, in particular, the freedom to decide whether to
bear or beget a child, are liberties protected by the due process clause.Y' Overly
46 Id. at 570-71.
47 Id. at 577.
48 Id. at 578.
491d. at 572, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (a state could not limit par-
ents' right to choose a private education which included the teaching of German, although it
could choose the curriculum for the public schools), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(a state could no: presume that a father of an illegitimate child was unfit to care for the child
after its mother's death).
0 408 U.S. at 472, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
51 408 U.S. at 575, n. 14. In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that Roth's first amend-
ment rights might have been violated, since he had strongly criticized the administration, Even
though he had no tenure, the reasons for nonrenewal should be examined to see if they are
only a cloak for an attack on activity or attitudes protected by the Constitution. 408 U.S. at
582.
52414 U.S. at 639, 647.
53 414 U.S. at 640, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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restrictive maternity leave regulations, the LaFleur Court concluded, constituted
a heavy burden on the exercise of a protected freedom because they penalize the
pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child.54 Thus, the Court made the first
determination required by Roih: due process requirements were applicable because
a protected liberty had been infringed upon by the board rules.35
The Court took the second step required by Rothsc by examining the respec-
tive interests of the school boards and teachers. It began by examining the inter-
ests advanced by the school boards in support of the rules to see if these interests
justified the particular procedures adopted by the boards. Four possible board
interests were found: (1) protecting teachers from embarrassment and insulating
school children from the sight of pregnancy,57 (2) maintaining continuity in
classroom instruction, 58 (3) keeping physically unfit teachers out of the class-
room,59 and (4) providing for administrative convenience."
The Court dealt summarily with the first interest in a footnote because the
school board's briefs did not contend that this concern was a legitimate basis for
the rules. 61 An interest in keeping pregnancy out of sight of children and pre-
venting embarrassment for the teacher could not support the early cut-off dates.
The board's interest in continuity of instruction, although significant and legit-
imate, was also found to be insufficiently related to the boards' requirements of
an early cut-off date to justify the rule. Indeed, the rule itself may interfere with
continuity when it requires, as it did in LaFleur, that the teachers quit in the middle
of the year when they may be able to complete it. The Court did find, however,
that the boards' concern for continuity of instruction supports their requirement of
advance notice of a firm date of departure, the date to be either chosen by the
teacher or set by the school board at a point a few weeks before the expected de-
livery date.62 The same interest supported the Cleveland board provision limiting
eligibility to return the semester following the birth. The Court regarded that pro-
vision as a "precisely drawn" means of avoiding unnecessary changes in classroom
personnel during any one school term.63
The interest in keeping physically unfit teachers out of the classrooms was found
54 414 U.S. at 640.
5 508 U.S. at 570-71.
56 See, id. at 570.
57 414 U.S. at 641, n. 9.
58ld. at 641.
59 Id. at 641-43.
.0 Id. at 643-46.
Md At the trial, the former Cleveland school superintendent testified that the embarrassment
of pupils and teachers had been a concern. At the time the rule was promulgated in 1952,
Ches:erfield County Board members testified that these matters were still a matter of concern.
414 U.S. at 641, n. 9. The Court refused, however, to impart legitimacy to this concern.
Rather, it noted the possible role of "outmoded taboos" in the adoption of the rules. They
agreed with the Second Circuit, which had opined in Green v. Water!ord Board of Education,
that "whatever may have been the reaction in Queen Victoria's time, pregnancy is no longer a
dir.y word." 473 F.2d 629, 635 (1973) cited at 414 U.S. at 641 n. 9.
6L 414 U.S. at 643.
63 Id. at 649. The Court did not discuss whether the Chesterfield County rule preventing
return until the following school year was precisely drawn. Since this long period of unem-
ployment can be a heavy burden for a teacher to bear, a more precisely drawn rule would per-
mit teachers to return at earlier natural breaks in the school year.
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by the Court to be legitimate on both educational and safety grounds. However,
the Court decided that, even assuming that some teachers become physically dis-
abled during the latter stages of pregnancy, the rules swecep too broadly in requir-
ing all pregnant teachers to leave.64 Furthermore, the Cleveland rule that a
teacher may not return to work until her child is three months old is arbitrary
and irrational because it is not reasonably related to the board's asserted interest
in the mother's fitness.0 5
In discussing this third interest, the Court drew on the recent due process deci-
sions of Vlandis v. KlineG8 and Stanley v. Illinois0 7 which held that permanent
irrebutable presumptions are disfavored under the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendment. When a presumption is "neither necessarily nor uni-
versally true in fact," and when the state has reasonable alternative means of mak-
ing the crucial determination, the due process clause requires that the state make an
individualized determination. 68
As in Vlandir and in Stanley, the Court in LaFleur applied the concept of the
"irrebutable presumption" to the boards' early leave dates and to Cleveland's three.
month rule. The early cut-off rule presumes that every teacher who reaches the
fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is physically incompetent to continue teaching.
The Court held that testimony in the trial court by expert witnesses established
that such a presumption is neither necessarily nor universally true.09 The Court
also found irrebutable presumptions in the Cleveland rule preventing the teach-
er's return for three months after childbirth.70 The rule contained conclusive pre-
sumptions to the extent that it reflected board thinking that no mother is physi-
cilly able to return for three months after birth or that new mothers are too busy
with their children within the first three months to allow a return to work.71 A
consensus of medical sources indicated that new mothers can return to full activity
or employment four or five weeks after childbirth if progress is normal.7 2 Because
the boards had reasonable alternative means of making an individualized determi-
nation, they could not use an irrebutable presumption.7
3
The boards' final justification, their interest in administrative convenience, was
found by the Court to be irisufficient, alone, to make valid what otherwise is a vio-
4 Id. at 644.
65 Id. at 649. Trial testimony by the former superintendent, Dr. Mark Schinnerer, indi-
cated that he originally prohibited mothers from returning for six months after the birth be-
cause lhe believed mothers should stay home with their children. Respondent's brief, Appendix
184a.
06412 U.S. 441 (1973). In Vlandis, the Court declared unconstitutional a Connecticut
statute which mandated an irrebutable presumption of nonresidency (if applicants applied from
or resided out-of-state) for the purpose of qualifying for reduced tuition rates.
67 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the Court declared unconstitutional an Illinois statute
which permitted the state to take custody of all illegitimate children upon the death of the
mother, without allowing the father to attempt to prove his parental fitness. It held that the
s:atute contained an irrebutable presumption that unmarried fathers are incompetent to raise
their children, a presumption which violated the due process clause.
08 414 U.S. at 645.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 649.
71Id. at 649 n. 15.
72 Id. at 645 n. 12.
73 Id. at 645.
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lation of due process of law.74 Citing Stanley v. Illinois,75 the Court reaffirmed
that the "Constitution recognizes higher value than speed and efficiency." 76 The
fourteenth amendment, therefore, requires the boards to use alternative means
which do not so broadly infringe upon the teachers constitutional liberty.77
2. Balancing of Interests
Since the lack of an individualized determination of fitness flawed the boards'
maternity rules, a case-by-case determination would seem to be the appropriate
form of hearing for determining the teachers' ability to work both before and after
pregnancy. However, the LaFleur Court mitigated the harshness of the Stanley
principle by considering the boards' interests in both administrative convenience and
continuity in the classroom. Thus, the Court took the second step outlined in
Roth :7 balancing the individual teacher's rights against the school board's inter-
ests to determine the appropriate forms of hearing for providing constitutional
due process to teachers taking maternity leave. The Court permitted the school
boards to require a teacher to submit health certificates from her own physician or
to have a medical examination by a school board physician in order to determine
her fitness to work before and after childbirth.7 9 However, the Court left open
the possibility that the boards may require a firm cut-off date during the last few
weeks of pregnancy, if justified by considerations not presented in Larleur.80
Boards may also require substantial advance notice of a firm cut-off date for their
convenience in finding a substitute.8 ' To insure continuity, they need not permit
the teacher to return during a semester.
8 2
C. Limitations of the Due Process Analysis
1. Future Application
In his dissent to LaFleur, Justice Rehnquist expressed fear that the thousands
of state and federal laws which draw lines which are less than perfect and which
might well prove to be arbitrary in individual cases will be vulnerable to the
"irrebutable presumption" analysis. In particular, he suggested that classifications
which establish age limits, such as laws regulating the activities of minors and the
retirement of older people, might be invalidated by the LaFleur decision. Indi-
vidualized hearings might be required to determine whether minors are mature
enough to (1) drink alcoholic beverages and drive cars, (2) vote, (3) run for po-
litical office and (4) marry. Justice Rehnquist was particularly afraid that LaFleur
might also lead to the invalidation of (5) mandatory government retirement stat-
74 Id. at 647.
75Id. at 646, citing 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
76 405 U.S. at 656.
'7 414 U.S. at 647.
78 408 U.S. at 570.
79 414 U.S. at 647 n. 14.
80 Id. at 647 n. 13, 649.
81 Id. at 643.
82 Id. at 649.
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utes, requiring instead a hearing to determine whether each person was still
healthy enough to work.83
The flaw in Justice Rehnquist's opinion is that he failed to consider that under
the procedural due process analysis legislative classifications are not defeated merely
because they include irrebutable presumptions. Procedural due process also re-
quires, initially, that a fundamental right be impinged upon and, secondly, that the
form of hearing adequately protect the interests of the parties. In some circum-
stances, a fundamental right may not be involved; in others, individualized hear-
ings may not be appropriate. With this in mind, the widespread invalidation of
legislation feared by Justice Rehnquist is unlikely to materialize.
Few laws regulating minors infringe upon constitutional rights or liberties.
No case has established a constitutional right to drive a car, to drink, or, for that
matter, to stay out after municipal curfew or to live independently of parental or
state supervision.
A citizen's right to vote has already been found deserving of constitutional pro.
tection under the equal protecton clause of the fourteenth amendment and may
also be deserving of protection under the due process clause. Where a citizen has
been deprived of the right to vote on an equal footing with other citizens in the
jurisdiction, classifications have been examined with strict scutiny and states must
show a necessary and compelling interest in support of them.8 5 Relying on these
cases, the Court might consider voting to be a fundamental right requiring individ.
ualized determination were it not for the strong policy behind the Voting Rights
Acts of 196586 and 1970,87 the Court's interpretation of those Acts,88 and the
t*enty-sixth amendment to the Constitution.89 This policy favors broad grants of
suffrage and the prohibition of potentially discriminatory qualifying procedures.
The primary purpose of the Voting Rights Acts was to eliminate individualized de-
terminations by the states of voting ability through the use of discriminatory literacy
83 Id. at 647-59.
84 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
85Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
8642 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
8742 U.S.C. § 1973 (Amended, 1970).
8 8 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
In Mitchell the Court upheld the constitutionality of provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 lowering the age limit to 18 for federal elections, but did not uphold the provisions low-
ering the age for state and local elections. It also found that Congress had the power to pro-
hibit the use of literacy tests or other devices used to discriminate against voters. In Kaizen-
bach the Court held that § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a proper exercise of power
granted to Congress by the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment. Section 4(e) pro.
vided that no person who completed the sixth grade of a school accredited by Puerto Rico
could be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write En.
glish. Besides the provisions mentioned above, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §
1973 et seq. (1970) provided for federal examiners (in certain areas of the country). The
1970 Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970), barred the use of literacy tests in all eleetions
for five years and forbade states from disqualifying voters in national elections by using state
residency requirements.
89 The twenty-sixth amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of age.
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tests. The twenty-sixth amendment lowered the voting age for all elections, re-
flecting the national consensus that at the age of eighteen American citizens are
mature enough to vote. The amendment and the statutes establish that govern-
ment has sufficiently weighty interests in preventing the reinstatement of the indi-
vidual hearings so abused in the past. The Court may therefore regard itself as
bound by precedent and by national policy in upholding a uniform age require-
ment.
Not only are individualized hearings weapons for abuse of the rights of mi-
nority groups, they are also available for use against political groups. Indeed,
the potential abuse of individual determinations of ability by incumbent political
parties may be viewed as an overriding state interest which would militate against
their use in determining either the capacity to vote or the qualifications for candi-
dacy.
The laws prohibiting the marriage of minors may be subject to attack under the
equal protection clause, since many of them discriminate between the sexes by
allowing women to marry at a lower age.90 Such laws are less likely, however, to
be found to violate the due process clause. First, many of them already provide
for a kind of individualized hearing by permitting under-age persons to marry
with their parents' consent.91 Second, even though it might be claimed that such
statutes infringe upon the fundamental right to marry,92 many lower courts have
found that a state's interest in creating stable family life is not only a rational basis
for marriage and divorce legislation, but also a compelling state interest where the
equal protection clause requires a strict standard of review.93 Thus, in balancing
state interests to determine the appropriate form of hearing, courts might well
decide that state interests in family stability can require young people to be old
enough to have had an opportunity to complete their high school education or to
prepare for work before assuming the responsibilities of marriage. Courts might
also decide that an appropriate form of hearing for the under-age person is that
hearing provided by parents, who are both responsible for the person's welfare
and best able to judge his or her maturity.94
Justice Rehnquist's assertion that mandatory retirement laws may be invalidated
9°See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Page 1973) (male persons of the age of
eighteen years and female persons of the age of sixteen years may be joined in marriage; a minor
must first obtain the consent of his parents or cour:-appointed guardian). See also AM. JUP.2o
DEsK BooK, Doc. 124, Marriage Laws, Oct. 1971, Department of Labor, Women's Bureau,
(Supp. 1974).
91 Some states require parental consent for persons under twenty.one and many states per-
mit marriage at an even younger age with parental consent. See AM. JUL2D DESK BOOK,
supra note 90.
9"The Supreme Court has long recognized that states have primary responsibility for legis-
lation in regard to marriage and divorce. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 237
(1944). The Courz stated in Williams that the inability to establish domicile is merely "one
of the untoward results inevitable in a federal system in which regulation of domestic relations
has been left with the states and not given to the national authority."
93 Durational residency requirements have been upheld because courts found that the
states' in:erest in the stability of the family unit can outweigh an infringement on the right to
travel. Place v. Place, 129 Vt. 326, 278 A.2d 710 (1971); Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp.
1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
94 Almost all the states permit women to marry at a younger age than men, but this dif-
ference may more likely be a reflection of culural sex-role expectations than of a presumption
that women are mature or educated at an earlier age.
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by due process claims is based upon the assumption that the Court regards a right
to work as resting on the same footing as the right to bear children.0 5 However,
in LaFleur itself, the Court refused to base its opinion on the right to work, even
though an amicus brief argued that it should.90  Relying on Trrtax v. Rdeb,"7
this brief contended that because the maternity leave rules infringed on the fun-
damental right to work, the strict standard of review required by the equal protec-
tion clause should be applied to them. 98
Truiax, decided in 1915, was one of the few cases asserting that a right to work
is one of the liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment. Another such case,
Meyer r. Nebraska,90 decided in 1922, was cited by the Larleur Court, 1°° not for
its assertion that a teacher's right to teach was a fundamental liberty, but rather for
the principle that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life constitutes such a liberty. Thus, the majority of the Court eschewed the argu.
ment that the right to work is a fundamental right, and found an infringement
only on the teacher's fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a
child. 101 Thus, the mandatory retiree cannot claim that he is deprived of a funda-
mental right by the' statutory limit on his job. Like Roth, he must have some other
constitutional claim as well.
Even were the Court to find a constitutional deprivation either in the laws
regulating minors or in the retirement laws, the magnitude of the administrative
inconvenience resulting from individual hearings required for every person near-
ing majority or retirement age might be a weighty enough state interest to balance
the individual's constitutional rights. Even in LaFleur, the Court left loopholes
alieving the school of having to provide individualized hearings for every preg-
nant or returning teacher.' 0 2 Thus, at some point, administrative convenience
alone may become a sufficient interest to outweigh a constitutional right.
Although the constitutional attacks on age classifications which Justice Rehn-
quist anticipates would probably be unsuccessful, he is probably accurate in sug-
gesting that there may be a flood of litigation to test the limits of the due process
concepts generally, and of the "irrebutable presumption" in particular.
2. The Adequacy of the Due Process Provided in L4Fleur
The remedies to the procedural due process flaws found in the maternity leave
rules were limited to the Court's suggestion of possible alternative forms of hear-
95414 U.S. at 649 citing Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1913).
90 Brief for International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies as Amicus Curiae.
07239 U.S. at 41. The Truax Court sta:ed: "['The right to work for a living in a common
occupation is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the pur-
pose of the [fourteenth) amendment to secure."
08 Brief, supra note 96, at 27.
9 262 U.S. 390 (1922). The Court invalidated a statute which prohibited the teaching of
all modern languages except English in any rchool in Nebraska. The statute effectively pre-
vented the practice of an entire profession, and the Court found that it violated the due process
clause because it was arbitrary and without a reasonable relation to the stated purpose i.e., the
"Americanization" of immigrant children.
100414 U.S. at 639.
101 Id. at 640.
102 414 U.S. at 647 n. 13. The Court allows the Board either to set a uniform cut-off date
late in pregnancy, or to let the teacher choose a firm date.
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ings which the boards could use in lieu of the early cut-off date and of the re-
quirement that the child have reached the age of three months before the mother's
return. While LaFleur authorized more flexible and less burdensome policies, it
also effectively empowered school boards to prevent immediate return to school
and to avoid a fair hearing. In short, the majority opinion in LaFleur makes it
possible for the school board to institute alternative procedures that would serve
the board's interests in administrative convenience, but could result in penalizing
the pregnant teacher as much as did the pre-LaFleur rules.
(a) Rebuttable presumption of incapacity. The opinion states that irrebut-
table presumptions are disfavored under the due process clause.303 However,
there is nothing in the opinion which obviates the possibility of a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a teacher is unfit to teach after four or five months of pregnancy
(or even earlier). The school board could require the teacher to rebut this pre-
sumption by producing proof of her health with a medical certificate, perhaps
every week, or upon request.6 4  However, such a procedure, without legitimate
grounds, is the kind of harrassment that should be considered a prima fade
violation of a teacher's rights. Furthermore, in LaFleur, the Supreme Court was
willing to assume only that some teachers become disabled during the latter stages
of pregnancy, not many teachers,' 0 5 and nowhere explicitly mentioned the possibil-
ity of establishing a rebuttable presumption.
(b) Board-established leave date. While the Court did recognize the possi-
bility of a firm date set by the teacher herself, it also recognized the permissibility
of a firm date during the last few weeks of pregnancy established by the school
board.' 00 The same objections can be made to such a regulation as were made to
the early cut-off date. It contains a presumption of unfitness unsupported by the
medical testimony and medical sources before the Court. 0 7 Second, the rule is
inconsistent in that it would protect the students from the sight of labor, but not
from the sight of morning-sickness or from the onset of spontaneous abortions
which may be sudden, unexpected, and painful, and which may occur during the
first three months of pregnancy, a period during which no teacher is required to
take maternity leave. Further, a board-set firm date provides no more classroom
continuity and administrative convenience than does a firm date set by the teach-
103 414 U.S. at 644.
104 The hearing provided for by Chesterfield County rule (b.) provided the opportunity for
such a rebuttal, but it also provided for a consideration of the "best interests" of the school,
regardless of the teacher's health. See no:e 5 supra.
103 414 U.S. at 644. The Court had before it statistics which indicated that 60-70% of all
pregnancies are normal.
106 414 U.S. 647 n. 13. The Court suggested that such regulations might be justified
^by considerations not presented in the LaFleur records, e.g., widespread medical consensus about
the disabling effect of pregnancy on a teacher's performance during the last weeks, evidence
showing that the requirement of firm cutoffs was the only reasonable method of preventing
labor from beginning while the teacher was in the classrcom, or proof that adequate substi-
tutes could not be procured without at least some minimal lead time and certainty as to the
date upon which employment was to begin.
107 414 U.S. at 645-46 n. 12. Medical witnesses for both parties emphasized that each
pregnancy is an individual mat-er and should be treated as such. They also testified that they
themselves permitted patients to work to the end of pregnancy, to participate in vigorous physi-
cal activity, and to con:inue to do housework, which, it was acknowledged, was more physically
strenuous than teaching. Respondents brief, Appendix 121a, 150.
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er.'0 8 Thus, the boards may further penalize pregnant teachers by setting an un-
realistic leave date.
(c) Summary determination of incapacity. LaPlem" permits the school doctor
to have the last word where a disagreement over the teacher's fitness occurs.
Such a summary procedure provides inadequate due process when compared to
the normal concept of a fair hearing, and, in fact, when compared to the hearing
provided by Ohio law' 0 9 for Ohio school teachers who have been asked to take
"unrequested leave." Section 3319.16 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for
notice, for a hearing examiner drawn from the local bar, for the opportunity to
be represented by counsel and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and for a
written result.11o In short, the non-pregnant Ohio teacher receives the full panoply
of due process under Ohio law, but the pregnant Ohio teacher may find herself in
a kangaroo court after LaFleur.
(d) Return to classroom duties. Since the Court objected to the three month
rule only because it contained an "irrebuttable presumption," a board might never-
theless establish some procedure for the teacher's return. Although an irrebutable
presumption of incapacity would be impermissible, the possibility of a rebulable
presumption to that effect again arises. The teacher would then have the burden
of proving her good health and her independence from the child. The Court
even appears to approve of the means for presenting this proof: viz., the doctor's
health certificate,"' and, in Chesterfield County, the requirement that the teacher
return only when she can give "full assurance that the child will cause minimal
interference with job responsibilities.""' 2 However, the Court also expressed skep-
tcism about any kind of presumption that teacher-mothers are unfit or too busy with
children1 xa3 Thus, the board which establishes even a rebuttable presumption in a
return rule would be undercutting the policy behind the Court's decision, i.e. to
free new mothers from stereotyped views of post-parturm behavior. Further, no
fair hearing is required in the event of disagreement between the school board
and the teacher's doctor as to her health. As with the leave date, the school
board doctor's decision prevails."
4
A less evident, but perhaps more severe, penalty may result from certain regu-
lations as yet permissible under LaFleur. The Cleveland rule provides for priority
for the returning teacher on reassignment to a vacancy for which she is qualified,
108 It is worth noting that Cleveland required no more than two weeks notice of leave and,
often, admittedly filled in with substitutes, sometimes even with students. See note 6 upra,
and Respondent's brief, Appendix 210e (testimony of Julius Tanczos, Jr., Secondary School
Superintendent of Cleveland Public Schools) Thus, continuity in the classroom does not ap.
pear to have been the primary reason for either the early leave date or for the advance notice
requirement.
10 0OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.16 (Page 1972).
110 Before LaFleur, the opportunity for a fair hearing providcd by state law was not pro.
vided to teachers required to go on maternity leave; neither LaFleur nor Nelson were per-
mitted to avail themselves of this opportunity. The most they were provided with was an
informal request to the Sup-rintendent for c6ntinuation in their jobs. At trial, Lafleur de.
scribed herself as being on "unrequested leave," but complained that the Board had failed to
provide her with the required fair hearing. Respondents' brief, Appendix 6 9a.
111414 U.S. at 647 n. 14.
1 1 2 Id. at 650 n. 16.
113Id. at 649 n. 15.
114 Id. at 650.
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but not to the exact position she had before her leave.115 The Chesterfield County
rule goes a step further and states that it will offer only one opening to the teacher
upon her return, thus "discharg[ing] its responsibility under this policy." These
rules combined with the rules that delay the teacher's return until the following
semester or year may help to effectuate a policy of keeping budgets low by hiring
new, inexperienced teachers at low salaries, rather than rehiring experienced teach-
ers at higher salaries who wish to come back to work after having children. 1 0
Thus the Court's due process analysis and remedies may result in something
less than adequate due process for pregnant school teachers. Unlike that author-
ized by LaFleur, the procedure that would best serve teachers' interests would be
one that permits the teacher herself to set a firm date for taking leave before
childbirth, requires a medical certificate of health only if individual capacity is
seriously questioned, permits her to return to her own classroom as soon as her
doctor determines that she is physically fit, and finally, permits a fair hearing if
the school board disagrees with her doctor's certification of health, either before or
after childbirth.
Further, the due process analysis leaves some of the most onerous provisions
of the maternity leave policies untouched. Unlike teachers who take leave for other
disabilities, teachers taking maternity leave may, under LaFlettr, lose several months
of work due to the next-semester rule, receive no pay for sick leave, must sustain
the burden of proof of their good health, and may be "pushed out" of their pro-
fession by the severe rules regulating their return to work and providing for dis-
missal. Had the Court based its decision on an equal protection analysis, school
boards would have been required to treat maternity leave as they treat other tem-
porary disabilities, providing a quicker return to the classroom, a fair hearing, and
sick leave pay.117
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Recent equal protection decisions have generally fallen into two categories:
1 5 See note 6 supra.
116 Since it is similar to many large city school systems, the Columbus, Ohio, school system
provides a good example of the effect of such policies. In the 1973-74 school year, 41%
of the elementary teachers had less than 5 6 years experience. On the junior high level, 51%
had less than 5 years experience. See Thompson, The Columbus School Report (July, 1974).
In an interview (Oct. 30, 1974), Mr. Thompson stated that these percentages had been de-
dining in the last few years due to the tighter job market and, perhaps, to the fact that female
teachers were not leaving the school system with as much frequency.
117 After the Sixth Circuit opinion in LaFeur, the Ohio legislature amended the statute
requiring sick leave pay for teachers by adding "pregnancy" to the required coverage. OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3319.141 (Page Supp. 1974). The amendment appears to permit the use
of sick leave pay for pregnancy at any stage, without limiting the use of sick leave to the period
of disability resulting from pregnancy and childbirth. Such broad coverage presents the pos-
sibility of abuse of this benefit by teachers who use up their accumulated sick leave days during
a period of pregnancy when they are not disabled. Commentators have suggested that two
kinds of leave should be available to pregnant employees: (1) leave for the disabilities of preg-
nancy and childbirth with sick leave benefits to be available to female employees; (2) leave for
child care, beginning after recuperation from childbirth, with a guaranteed job after one or
two years (but without sick pay or increases in fringe benefits) to he available on a non.dis-
criminatory basis to either parent. See Koontz, Childbirth and Child Rearing Leat'e: Job re-
lated Benefits, 17 N.Y. LAw FoRuM 480, 481 (1971) citing Citizens Advisory Council on
the Status of Women, Women in 1970 at 4 (1971); Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New Con-
ceptions of Maternity Leave, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L REv. 260, 291 (1972).
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(1) those applying a minimal standard of review requiring that state legislation be
upheld if the Court cannot conceive of any reasonable basis for the classification 118
and (2) those applying a stricter standard of review where a suspect classification
or a fundamental right exists and requiring the state to show both that it has a com-
pelling interest in the classification and that it can find no less restrictive means to
pursue that interest.1 19 Within the last few years, the Court seems to have become
dissatisfied with this two-tiered, self-predicating equal protection analysis and has
begun to develop a middle ground for judicial examination under both the due
process and equal protection clauses requiring a demonstrably reasonable basis 120
for legislation which infringes on constitutionally protected liberties or affects classi-
fications which the Court is unwilling to consider "suspect."
' 21
Most lower court decisions dealing with the maternity leave issue were based
on equal protection grounds.' 22 Although the equal protection arguments have
been discussed in detail elsewhere,' 23 a summary of them will be helpful in sug-
118 In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), (upholding a state
statute prohibiting op'icians from fitting glasses or making lenses without prescription), the
Court speculated about possible reasons for enacting the legisation without any legislative source
on which to rely. The Court refused to apply the equal protection clause unless discrimination
was found to be "invidious."
119 See for a definition of suspect classifications: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(striking down municipal legislation discriminatory in its application to Chinese laundrymen,
the Court found discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, or alienage unjustified and
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause); Korematsu v. United Stacs, 323 U.S. 214,
2"16 (1944):
*.. [A]II legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Presenting public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism
never can.
Cases involving infringement on fundamental rights include: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (compulsory sterilization for criminals infringes on marriage and procrea.
tion, basic civil rights which are fundamental to the survival of the human race); Loving v,
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Statute prohibiting inter-racial marriage infringes on the right to
marriage); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 382 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax infringes
upon the right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (durational residence re-
quirement for welfare recipient infringes upon the right to travel).
120 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971):
The Equal Protection Clause of that Amendment does, however, deny to the States
the power to legislate that different trea'ment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective
of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike, ... "
Id. at 75-76 quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 415 (1920). In Reed, the Court
invalidated a statute discriminating on the basis of sex between persons applying for letters of
administration because the classification was arbitrary and could not be upheld merely to ac.
complish the elimination of hearings on the merits. See also, Gunther, note 28 upra, at 18.24;
Nowak, note 10 supra.
121 See Nowak, note 10 supra, at 1103.
122See, e.g., Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (B.D. Va.
1971), 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp, 1208
(N.D. Ohio 1971), 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
123 Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV, CIZV
RIGHrs-CW. LIB. L. REV. 260, 273-77 (1972).
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gesting why the Supreme Court did not rely on the equal protection clause. To
establish that an equal protection violation has occurred, a court must find that
the pregnancy classification discriminates either on the basis of sex or on the basis
of differences between disabilities. If sex is found to be a suspect classification,
then any classification on that basis is invidious, and a strict standard of review is
required. Otherwise, the classification is non-invidious, and the traditional
standard of minimal rationality or the more recent standard of strengthened ration-
ality should be applied.
A. The Characterization of the Discrimination: Sex or Disability?
If maternity leave rules, which contain a classification on the basis of preg-
nancy, are found to discriminate on the basis of sex, the recent Supreme Court
decisions in Reed v. Reed'2 4 and Frontiero v. Richardson'2 5 indicate that the Su-
preme Court may be willing to apply to such state action a strict standard of re-
view under the equal protection clause. Thus, governmental subdivisions defend-
ing maternity leave policies have naturally argued that the policies do not constitute
sex discrimination. They contend, first, that maternity leave policies discriminate
only against pregnant women as opposed to all women, and against only a narrow
category of pregnant employees as opposed to all non-pregnant employees, both
male and female. Merely because only women can become pregnant does not
mean that all women are discriminated against by pregnancy classification. 26  Sec-
ond, they argue that this is not an area in which there exists a competitive ad-
vantage: (1) only women can become pregnant, thus, there is no competition with
men;' 27 and (2) male employees receive no special economic advantages as a result
of the maternity leave policy.' 28 Finally, it is argued that pregnancy is treated dif-
ferently only because it differs from other disabilities in significant ways: it is vol-
untary, 29 predictable,13o and the risks and disabilities of pregnancy are such that
women must be forced to leave early because they will not retire of their own
volition.131
The response to these arguments is generally based on a broad view of the
sociological and economic impact of classifications affecting women in their child-
bearing roles. First, pregnancy is, after all, a sex-linked characteristic, and it does
affect almost all women at some time during their lives. -32  The Supreme Court
has stated that the fact that some, rather than all, members of one sex are affected
does not legitimize an otherwise unlawful discriminatory provision.133 Besides,
124 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
125411 U.S. 677 (1973).
1:26 Petitioner's Brief at 20; See alo, Comment, Equal Protection and the Pregnancy Leave
Care, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 628, 1973) [hereinafter cited Comment].
127 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973).
'
2 8 See, Comment at 650.
129 Id. at 629.
130 Petitioner's Brief at 12.
'I Petitioner's Brief at 5-6, 11-12; see also, Comment at 648.
132 Only 15.6% of married women, age twenty and over, are childless. U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population 1970, Detailed Characteristics, PC.
(1)-D1-U.S. Summary Table 212, at 41 (1971), cited in Respondent's Brief at 25 n. 11.
133 Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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discrimination should not be tolerated under the guise of physical properties pos.
sessed by one sex.1 3 4 Finally, attitudes toward and treatment of pregnancy are
more often a manifestation of cultural sex-role conditioning than a response to
medical fact and necessity. In short, they are based on sex-role stereotypes. 1t 5
Second, it is ludicrous to suggest that women are competing with men in the
area of child-bearing. Rather, they are competing as wage and salary earners for
seniority, promotions, benefits, and other work-related advantages. 80 Statistically,
women do lose a great deal of income due to laws related to their child-bearing
roles.137 Their low level of income as compared to that received by men is due
primarily to their erratic work pattern.13
Third, pregnancy is not different from other disabilities. Hospitalization,
medical treatment, and convalescence occur at the time of childbirth, but unless
abnormal, pregnancy is no more disabling than slight obesity, for which no leave
is required. 139 Pregnancy will never be wholly voluntary: no birth-control meth.
od is fail-safe, and those that fail least often are those most dangerous to their
users. 140 To require all women to use birth-control in order to keep a job would
134 Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
1 3 Heath v. Wes:erville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D. Ohio 1972):
While it may be true that some women are incapacitated by pregnancy and would be
well advised to adopt regimens less s:renuous than those borne by school teachers,
to say this is true of all women is to define that half of our populaton in sterotypical
terms and to deal with them artificially.
130 Respondent's Brief at 25.
137 Respondent's Brief at 25, citing the testimony of Herbert Stein and Marjorie Whitman
of the President's Council of Economic Advisors before the Serate-House Joint Economic Com-
mittee, July 10, 1973, pointing to the lack of continuous work experience as an important fac-
tor in women's lower salary levels.
138 During 1972, earnings of full-time, year-round woman workers averaged only 59.5%
of men's wages. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Money Income in 1971 of
Families and Persons in the United States, Table 56, Current Population Reports. Series
P-60, No. 85 (1972), cited in Respondent's Brief at 25.
139 Cf. Parolisi v. Board of Examiners of the City of New York, 55 Misc. 2d 546, 285
N.Y.S.2d 936 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (holding that dismissal of a teacher for obesity was arbitrary
since the condition did not impair her ability to teach).
140 The manufacturers of birth control pills which claim to provide "almost completely ef.
fective contraception," advise women not to use them if they have thromboembolic disorders,
impaired liver function, suspected carcinoma of the breast, or undiagnosed genital bleding.
Lederle Laboratories. For Their Peace of Mind and Yours 6 (August, 1974). Retrospective
studies of morbidity and mortality in Great Britaip and studies of morbidity in the United
States have shown a statistically significant association between thrombophlebitis, pulmonary
embodism, and cerebral thrombosis and embolism and the use of oral contraceptives. Royal
College of General Practitioners: Oral Contraceptihn and Thromboembolis Dhease, 13 J,
COLL. GEN. PRAcr. 267-69 (1967); Inman and Vessey, Invejtigation of Deathi from Pul.
monary Coronary and Cerebral Thrombosis and Embolism in Women of Child-Bearing Age,
2 BRIT. MED. J. 193-99 (1968); Vessey and Roll, Ins'estigaton of Relation between Ue
of Oral Contraceptives and Thromboembolis Disease: A Further Report, 2 BRIT. M131), J.
651-57 (1969); Sartwell, Mais, Arthea, Greene and Smith, Thromboembolism and Oral Con-
traceptives: An Epidemiological Case-Control Study, 90 AM. J. EIPIItM. 365-80 (1969).
The possible side-effects of birth control pills include swelling, nausea and vomiting, weight
gain or loss, darkening of the skin, higher levels of sugar and fatty substances in the blood,
irregular vaginal bleeding, loss or increase of body hair, nervous tension, change in sexual ap.
petite, and, most dangerous, blood clots. See Orthco Pharmaceutical Corporation, After Your
Doctor Prescribes Orth-Novum 2 (1971). I hese unpleasant side-effects may cause women
to choose other, less effective forms of birth control. When these fail, the only alternative to
be to infringe upon their first amendment rights,141 and upon their right to bear
children and, in the end, would ignore the necessity of childbirth for the survival
of the human species.' 42 On the other hand, many other temporary disabilities and
illnesses are voluntarily induced, primarily through the abuse of food, drink, cigar-
ettes, and drugs.' 43 The predictability of pregnancy and childbirth makes it
easier to plan ahead for substitutes, but, logically, should not thereby require an
early unnecessary leave.
Finally, to suggest that pregnant women must be forced to quit early to pro-
tect their health, their children's health, and the quality of teaching in the class-
room is to imply that pregnant women care less than other teachers about those
matters. Such an implication is prejudiced. Furthermore, it flies in the face of
reality, since pregnant women are under the continual supervision of doctors while
others who may not be aware of illness or disability may inadvertently infect
children and harm their own health.
The question of whether any of these arguments were heeded by the Court
in considering the LaFleur case is partly answered in Geduddig v. Aiello.144 In
Aiello, decided after LaFleur, the Court examined the issue of classification of
pregnancy again, this time in the equal protection context. Mrs. Aiello was one
of several pregnant women who were excluded from California's disability insur-
ance system for private employees. Several of the women had abnormal preg-
nancies, and during the course of litigation in the state courts, the defendant De-
partment of Human Resources agreed to include abnormal pregnancies under the
plan.' 45 The Supreme Court decided that exclusion of normal pregnancies from
the insurance plan was not invidious discrimination where it related to under-
inclusiveness of the set of risks the State had elected to insure.'46 The State had
also excluded (1) several disabilities created by court order, (2) short-term disa-
bilities (those of less than eight day duration), and (3) disabilities lasting longer
than twenty-six days. The Court said that the California legislation did not ex-
clude pregnancy because of gender. Rather, it only excluded one physical condi-
tion which is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique charac-
teristics. The Court reasoned that while it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning preg-
nancy is a sex-based classification.1 47 Thus, since the Court has held that not all
pregnancy classifications are sex-based, it follows that not every pregnancy dassi-
fication will necessarily be subjected to the same standard of review.
continuing the pregnancy is abortion, against which many women have religious and moral
objections.
141 Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 399 (1963) (holding unconstitutional the conditioning
of freedom of religion by denial of workmen's compensation to Seventh Day Adventist who
refused to take a job which required working on Sunday).
142 Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right to bear children is funda-
mental).
143 Respondents Brief at 52.
144417 U.S. 484 (1974).
145 Id. at 491.
14G Id. at 494.
147 Id. at 496 n. 20.
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B. The Appropriate Standard of Review of Pregnancy Classifications
The traditional equal protection test, found in Lindsley v. National Carbonic
Gas Co.,148 states that "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain the classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law
was enacted must be assumed." The school boards in LaFleur asked the Court to
use this standard of minimal rationality, and to find an adequate basis for the
maternity leave rules in their interests in physically capable teachers, in classroom
continuity, and in administrative convenience.
149
The teachers argued that the Court should apply either the strict standard16o or
the Reed v. Reed' 51 standard of review to the rules. In Frontiero v. Richardson,
four members of the Supreme Court agreed that classification based on sex should
be suspect, as are those based on race, alienage, or national origin. 152 The teach-
ers in LaFleur asked that a majority of the Court affirm that such classifications
are suspect and that the maternity leave rules contain suspect classifications.' 58
These strict standards should also be applied, they argued, because the maternity
leave rules penalized the exercise of their fundamental rights to bear children.154
If the Court chose not to apply the strict standard, the teachers contended
that, at the very least, it should apply Reed's standard of demonstrable rationality,65
applied by the lower courts in these cases. In Reed, the Court held that classifica-
tions must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of legislation, so that per.
sons similarly circumstanced are treated alike.15 There, the Court found that dis.
crimination on the basis of sex in selection of administrators was exactly the kind
of arbitrary classification prohibited. In LaFleur, the teachers argued that the ma-
ternity leave rule was also arbitrary and unrelated to any legitimate interest in the
health of the teacher, the continuity of the classroom, or administrative conve-
nience. Furthermore, it was arbitrary because it contained irrebuttable presumptions
which were invalid or irrelevant. 157
In LaFleur, the Court made use of portions of these arguments, but did not
accept the basic proposition that a suspect classification was involved. However,
more recently, in Aiello, the Supreme Court indicated when it would be willing
to consider pregnancy classifications to be suspect and therefore invidious:
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pre-
text designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members
of one sex or another, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or
148 220 U.S. 61, 78-9 (1911).
149 Petitioner's Brief at 31.
o5 0 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
151 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
152 411 U.S. 677. The court stated that sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.
153 Respondent's Brief at 27.
14 Id. at 41.
155404 U.S. 71 (1971).
5N Id. at 75-6.
157 Respondent's Brief at 48.51.
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exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any
reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition5sB
It is not clear what class of legislation the Court refers to in the phrase
"legislation such as this." It may mean insurance plans, or, more broadly, any
program for disability or illness (such as sick leave or workmen's compensation),
or it may mean only plans which also exclude other disabilities. The Court clear-
ly intends that the traditional standard of review be applied to such legislation,
but the extent of the class may be the subject of much litigation. Aeilo indicates
that the Court will place the burden of proof upon the challenging parties to show
that pregnancy classification was intended to be invidious.159
Invidious, or malicious, intention is very difficult to prove, however. Mater-
nity leave rules have been defended as part of the beneficent, protective legislation
coming out of the women's reform movement of the nineteenth century.16° In
Kahn v. Shevin,161 decided after LaFleur, the Court indicated that it would up-
hold legislation favoring women, if it found that the purpose of the law was to
redress unequal economic effects on women.102  In Kahn, a Florida statute which
exempted widows from property tax was approved because women were presumed
to have lower incomes and more straitened circumstances than other taxpayers.2U
Maternity leave rules, however, may not have been the product of unadulterated
good will toward women. There is some evidence to suggest that such rules are
part of an historical pattern of discrimination against female teachers and are based
158 417 U.S. at 496 n. 20.
159 In LaFleur, the Court did not decide what the effect would be on pregnancy leave clas-
sifications of Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970), because
the act did not apply to state agencies or educational institutions at the time that the school
teachers were required to take leave. On March 24, 1972, Title VII was amended to withdraw
tho:e exemptions. Pub. L 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission has since promulgated guidelines providing that a mandatory leave or termination policy
for pregnant women presumptively violates Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10, 37 Fed. Reg.
6837. Since that time, two courts have found that Title VII was violated where boards of
education refused to pay sick leave benefits to women absent for pregnancy and childbirth dis-
abilities. Farkas v. Southwestern School Dist., No. 73-169 (S.D. Ohio, April 9, 1974); Liflo
v. Plymouth Bd. of Educ., No. C-73-184-4 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 3, 1973).
Briefs for LaFleur disagreed on the weight to be given these guidelines. See, Respondents
Brief at 22 and Petitioner's Brief at 29. Although the Commission's position was not before the
LaFleur Court, the EEOC fully argued its position in an amicus brief in Aidlo, asserting that
systematic and positive discrimination against women was frequently found in employers' denial
of employment opportunity and benefits to women on the basis of the childbearing role, per-
formed solely by women. Brief of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission as amicus curiae at 10, cited in Aiello, 417 U.S. 502 n. 6. (Brennan. J. dissenting).
It may be argued that after Aiello, women employees may be able to obtain sick leave pay
for the disabilities of normal pregnancy and childbirth through the courts only where sick
leave programs can be distinguished from the type of risk-insurance program considered in
that case. An emp!oyee may be more successful, however, in acquiring back pay where she has
been required to take leave pursuant to an unconstitutionally arbitrary leave requirement. See,
Shirley v. Chagrin Falls Bd. of Educ., - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ohio 1974).
16o Comment, rupra note 126, at 636.
161416 U.S. 351 (1974).
162 Id. at 355.
163 Id. at 353. The dissent by Justice Brennan said that there was not even a reasonable
relationship between this classification and the objective of the tax, since only poor widows
should be exempted. 416 U.S. at 357-9.
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on policies with tainted roots.164 At the turn of the century, rules were made to
prevent the employment of married female teachers,65 based on fears that schools
were being feminized 0 0 and that the employment of women would discourage
the rearing of families.167  Later, barriers were erected to the employment of wom-
en with children and to the retention of pregnant teachers. As a result of economic
and judicial pressure, 16 bans against women with children disappeared, but were
replaced by mandatory leave policies with early leave and late return dates. The
fact that these dates were not often revised in accordance with modern medical
opinion and practice suggests that the dates were not primarily designed to insure
health or classroom continuity, but instead were intended to keep pregnancy out of
sight and mothers at home.109 Thus, some evidence exists that mandatory leave
policies were, and still are, based on invidious discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the lower courts found that the maternity leave rules involved an
equal protection issue, the Supreme Court eschewed the equal protection clause
as the basis for their decision and found due process violations instead. LaFletr,
along with the two recent cases, Geduidig v. Aiello and Kahn v. Shevt, suggests
that the Court may not be willing to invalidate classifications merely because they
are based on sex characteristics. The Court may have found it difficult to accept
the concept that classification with regard to pregnancy and childbirth is necessarily
a sex-based classification or invidious. The Court also may have feared the future
consequences of making such classifications suspect: litigation with respect to "pro-
tective legislation" favoring women, to discriminatory rules respecting clothing and
hair styles, or to discriminatory employment of persons exhibiting deviant sexual
behavior.
170
The Court's decision on the basis of due process, on the other hand, may
164 See Amicus Brief for the National Education Association and the Women's Equity Action
League Educational and Legal Defense Fund 3 [hereinafter cited NEA Brief].
165NEA Brief at 9 citing 1. WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN TUII
UNITED STATES 509 n. 19 (1966) [hereinafter cited as I. WOODY].
106 L WOODY at 513.
107NEA Brief at 10 citing Snedden, Prrnal Problems in Educational Adminitration:
Married Women as Public School Teachers, 36 TEACHERS COLLEGrs RECORD 613, 621 (1935).
168 See, People ex rel. Peixotto v. Board of Educ., 82 Misc. 6,4, 144 N.Y.S. 87 (Sup. Ct.
1913).
16 NEA Brief at 12 citing Administratite Practices Allcctng Classroom Teachers, Part 1:
The Selection and Appointment of Teachers, 10 RESEARCH BULL. 20 n.22 (1932).
170 Cl. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973). Judge
Haynsworth had some of the same difficulties in dealing with the concept and expressed his
fears of future litigation-some of which have already come to pass:
We are not accustomed to thinking, as sex classification, of statutes making it a crime
for a man forcefully to ravish a woman, or, without force, carnally to know a female
child under a certain age. Military regulations requiring all personnel to be clean
shaven may be suspect on other grounds, but not because they have no application
to females. Prohibition or licensing of prostitution is a patent regulation of sexual
activity, the burden of which falls primarily on females, but it has not been thought an
invidious sex classification. What of regulations requiring adult women sunning
themselves on a public beach to keep their breasts covered? Is that an invidious
discrimination based upon sex, a denial of equal protection because the flat and hairy
chest of a male lawfully may be exposed?
(Vol. 351026
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also result in multitudinous litigation testing legislation containing irrebuttable pre-
sumptions not necessarily related to sex discrimination. Finally, the Court's at-
tempt to provide due process for pregnant teachers, while taking into consideration
the school boards' interests, has permitted those school boards to use several pro-
cedures which could accomplish results similar to the former maternity leave rules.
After LaFleur, the pregnant teacher may yet be pushed out of the school system
for a long maternity leave, and the mother-teacher may continue to find it difficult
to return to her classroom.
Barbara A. Maurer
CIVIL PROCEDURE-CLASS ACTION SUITS-CLASS WIDE AWARDs OF
BACK PAY IN SUITS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIvIL RIrTs AT OF 1964.
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
I. INTRODUCTION
The decade since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
has seen major growth of substantive rights in the area of equal employment op-
portunity. Title VII, which prohibits discrimination by employers or unions on
the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin,2 has been interpreted to
prohibit discriminatory educational requirements, testing procedures, and senior-
ity provisions,3 and to provide injunctive and affirmative relief to both individuals
and classes.4 The Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 18715 have been resurrected by
the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,G and can be used to provide
relief to victims of discrimination in employment situations not covered by Title
142 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Act), amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964). Johnson's suit was filed in 1967 under the 1964 version of the
Act; although the relevant provision appears in the original Act, many of the provisions were
carried over into the new Act without substantial change. Therefore citations refer to the lit-
ter version of the Act, unless otherwise indicated.
2 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1972).
3 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
CoMMISsIoN, GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT SELECTION PROCEDURES, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607-3,
1607.13 (1973).
4 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 E2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1971) (originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
April 9, 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1-2, 14 Stat. 27; re-enacted in the Civil Rights Acts of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat 144, and April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). See note 6 infra
for a description of these sections.
6 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court held that § 1982 applied to acts of racial discrimination
in the sale of housing, private activities which were not within the color of any state law. Sec-
tion 1981, which guarantces the right to make and enforce contracts, was extended by analogy
to prohibit private acts of discrimination concerning employment contracts, Sanders v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1970); Boudreaux v.
Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
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VII.7 In addition, a plaintiff can avoid some of the procedural complexities of
the Act by bringing an action under the Civil Rights Act.8
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.9 illustrates the many facets of dis-
crimination that may be attacked and the broad range of relief available in cases
brought under the Act and § 1981 in equal employment opportunity cases.10
R. L. Johnson, a black employee in the Houston, Texas Goodyear plant, insti-
tuted the action on behalf of himself and all other black employees similarly situ-
ated. -It was undisputed that until 1962, all blacks working for Goodyear were
segregated into the Labor Department, the department with the least skilled and
lowest paying positions in the plant. Johnson alleged continuing discrimination
by Goodyear through its use of testing and educational requirements that had
been imposed since 1957 on applicants for all jobs in. the plant except those in
the Labor. Department. Any employee wishing to transfer from the Labor De-
partment had to meet these testing and educational standards, whereas employees
hired in other departments before 1957 were free to transfer without meeting
them. In addition, the collective bargaining agreement between Goodyear and
Local 347 of the International Union of Operating Engineers provided for a
seniority system under which an employee forfeited seniority rights if he changed
departments."' Johnson alleged that this system was another discriminatory mea-
sure that effectively restricted blacks to the lowest paying positions, Goodyear had
offered several remedial plans to the blacks within the Labor Department, 12 all of
which Johnson claimed were inadequate. Johnson sought to enjoin the use of
Goodyear's testing and educational requirements and departmental seniority sys-
tim, and to obtain back pay for himself and the entire class to compensate for eco-
nomic losses suffered from these discriminatory practices.
Both the district court and court of appeals found evidence of discrimination
7 The Act does not apply to.employers with fewer than fifteen employees, unions with fewer
than fifteen members, employment of aliens outside the United States, or employment of a
person for a religious purpose. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-e(b), (e) and § 2000e-2 (1972), amend.
ing 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(b), (e) and § 2000e-2 (1964).
8 The provisions of the Act requite the filing of charges with the Equal Employment Op.
portunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days after the unlawful practice occurred. Here also
the requirements were more restrictive under the original Act). 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (a),
(c) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (c) (1964).
p491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), af'g 349 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
10 The remedies under the Act and § 1981 are the same; see Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097, 1099, n. 6. The court in Johnion, however, did not grant relief under §
1981 in this case because it considered notice to the employer of his liability under § 1981 cs.
sential before a cause of action could arise. 491 F.2d at 1378-79.
11 Local 347 was joined as a defendant after it sought an injunction against Goodyear for
attempting to expand the seniority rights of its collective bargaining agreement with its black
employees.
12 Goodyear was a government contractor at all times relevant to this suit, and each plan
was formulated at the insistence of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance. 491 F.2d 1364 citing Brief for Plaintiffs-Appzllants at 8.9. The first
Goodyear plan was to allow all emp!oyees hired into the Labor Department before 1957 to
transfer, providing they had a seventh grade education and could pass the tests. After no
minority employee was able to pass the tests, Goodyear offered in 1969 to allow transfer with-
out taking the test. This offer bore few results, due to the loss of !eniority rights upon trans.
fer from the Labor Department. Finally, in 1911. Goodyear off ted to allow transfer without
passing the test, and in addition provided that seniority rights could be transferred. 349 F.
Supp. at 9.
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from the above facts. The district court enjoined the use of testing and educational
requirements for the transfer of black employees hired before 1957, and ordered
the creation of a new seniority system for these same employees. It ordered that
back pay be given only to Johnson.'3 The court of appeals determined that dis-
crimination had extended to all black employees hired before Goodyear's adoption
of an acceptable remedial plan in 1971, and ordered that back pay be awarded to
all black employees hired into the Labor Department before 1971 to compensate
them for intervening economic loss. 1 4
In the first years of enforcement of Title VII the thorny problems of defining
and identifying discrimination occupied the courts' attention. The Supreme Court
decided many of these issues15 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'0 and the issues which
today remain unclear are (1) which types of relief are most appropriate to carry
out the purposes of Title VII and § 1981, and (2) which plaintiffs are entitled to
such relief. As the court of appeals remarked in Johnon, "Title VII litigation
is now entering what may properly be termed the 'recovery stage.' ,,T The Act
gives the courts a broad range of remedies:
[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlaw-
ful employment practices, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay... or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.' 8
This note will briefly examine the substantive guarantees of Title VII which Good-
year and the union violated and then focus on the use of the class action device
and the nature of the monetary relief given. Particular emphasis will be given to
the dass-wide award of back pay, a remedy which is relatively new.
Although class-wide award of back pay is gaining increased acceptance among
the circuits, its scope and general application have not yet been agreed upon.29
Johnson marks the Fifth Circuit's first use of such relief. The court stated that
13 349 F. Supp. at 17-18. The period for Johnson's back pay extended to February 4,
1967, ninety days prior to the filing of the charge of discriminatory practices with the EEOC.
This period was determined through a restrictive reading of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964),
which required that the charge be filed with the EEOC not more than ninety days after the dis-
criminatory practice had been committed, not discovered. 349 F. Supp. at 18 n. 8.
14 Back pay was limited to a two-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, by the
court of appeals reading of the Texas two year statute of limitations for back pay relief. 491
F.2d at 1378. The two year limitation is set by the Act as well as in the 1972 amendment. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1972). See note 63 infra for the court's definition of the class en-
titled to relief.
15 This is not to imply that the determination of discrimination is now an easy task: it was
to this problem that much of the district court's opinion was devozed, and it formed the basis
of several appeals from that opinion. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Arguments I and I, 349
F. Supp. 3.
10 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
17 491 F.2d at 1380.
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1972).
19 It is now established in five circuits and the District of Columbia that affirmative relief
may be awarded to members of the class who did not file with the EEOC (see note 8 jupra) :
Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870
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class-wide back pay is available . . . when the aggrieved class has dem-
onstrated cognizable deprivations based on racial discrimination by the
employer .... As to monetary relief, nothing more is required; nothing
less is acceptable.20
This new standard for the award of back pay further enhances the power of
plaintiffs in class action suits under Title VII. It does raise some very real prob-
lems, however, in the use of the class action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure with respect to the constitutional rights of the unnamed class
members.-2 In addition, it severely limits the traditional discretion of the trial
court in fashioning appropriate relief for each situation.22 Both of these prob-
lems point to the need for a revision of the formula for relief promulgated by
the court in Johnson.
If. SUBSTANTIVE GUARANTEES OF TITLE VII
Title VII's prohibition against discrimination is easiest to enforce in cases of
overt discrimination, such as Goodyear's automatic relegation of blacks to the La-
bor Department prior to 1962.23  Finding a Title VII violation is more difficult
when employment standards are neutral or objective on their face, but still result
in the exclusion of all members of a class when applied. Testing and educa-
tional requirements and seniority provisions are examples of such "objective stan-
dards." These practices were all challenged in Johnson. The "anti-preferential"
clause of the Act states that an employer may use testing and other qualification
procedures so long as they are fairly applied.24 The problem has been deter-
mining when such standards were fairly applied. For example, on a purely sta-
tistical basis, requiring a high school diploma excludes a greater proportion of
blacks than whites. 25 Other requirements set by employers function in a similar
fashion,26 and the original Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
(6th Cir. 1973); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), carl. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971); Watkins v. Washington, 472 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
-0491 F.2d at 1375. The question of whether the court should award class.wide back
pay was specifically reserved in United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 919 n. 16
(5th Cir. 1973).
21 See text at III infra.
2 2 See text at IV A infra.
23 491 F.2d at 1368-69.
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (1972). Thus professionally developed ability tests and bona
fide seniority systems are protected. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (1972). The EE1OC has inter-
preted "professionally developed" to mean that tests or educational requirements must measure
an employee's ability to perform the specific job in question, not to mean that the test was de-
veloped by a professional. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1973).
25 In 1972, 36.4 present of all whites in the United States had high school diplomas, com-
pared to 24.9 percent of all blacks. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT O1 COMMI 1(1l,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 115 (1973) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRAC'
OF THE US.]. The disparity was even greater in the population examined by the court in
Johnson: in 1960, 39.9 percent of all Texas blacks had high school diplomas, compared to 66,9
percent of Texas whites. 491 F.2d at 1371.
26 Statistics show a similar variance between blacks and whites in other traditional employ.
ment requirements. A qualification of job experience exludes more blacks than whitev: the
national unemployment rate in 1972 was ten percent of the total black population, compared
to five percent of the white population. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE US 224 (1973).
Similarly, in the area of employment testing, blacks as a group scotc une statidtrd variation
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Employment Selection procedures sought to handle such problems by defining
discrimination as any procedure which adversely affected employment opportu-
nities of any group protected under Title VII.-
The Supreme Court ratified this interpretation of discrimination in Griggs V.
Duke Power Co., 2 8 defining discrimination in terms of consequence rather than
motive, and effect rather than intent.2 9 Thus, any procedure which screens out a
higher percentage of black than white job candidates is discriminatory regardless
of intent: statistical evidence of underrepresentation of protected racial groups
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination.30 Once a prima facie case has
been made, only by a showing of business necessity will an employer be permitted
to continue the discriminatory hiring practice. The employer has the burden of
showing an "overriding legitimate business purpose . . . sufficiently compelling
to override any racial impact .. . [with) no acceptable alternative policies or
practices . 3. " 1
Post-hiring practices have been held discriminatory as well if they "freeze" the
effects of past discrimination. For example, a departmental seniority plan in a
company which once had totally segregated departments may operate to prevent
promotion of members of a protected class to skilled jobs, and thus constitute
discrimination.
32
III. MAINTAINING A CLASS ACTION SUIT UNDER TITLE VII
Although the 1964 version of Title VII did not expressly authorize class ac-
tion suits,3 3 courts have generally held such suits permissible under Title VII.
The first case fully to consider the issue was Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.,a4 in
which a district court held that actions against racial discrimination were, by def-
inition, class suits. The relief granted to the class members was sharply limited
in Hall by the district court's strict interpretation of the procedural requirements
of Title VII: named plaintiffs who had not first filed charges with the EEOC
were denied monetary relief and limited to injunctive relief. This pattern of
limited relief was followed by other district courts into the early 1970's. The ini-
tial reluctance to grant monetary relief to an entire class has been variously ex-
below whites. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARV.
EDuc. REv. 1, 81-86 (1969).
2 7
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIssIoN, GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYmhENT
SELECTION PROCEDURES, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.3, 1607.13 (1973).
28401 U.S. 424 (1970). The Supreme Court in so doing stated that the EEOC GUIDE-
LINES, as the administrative interpretation of the Act, were entitled to great deference. Id. at
433-34.
29 401 U.S. at 432.
3 0 Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cit. 1972).
3 1 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
32 401 U.S. at 430.
33 The only provision in the 1964 version of the Act for any type of class action suit al-
lowed the Attorney General to bring an action when he found a pattern or practice of racial
discrimination. This responsibility now belongs to EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.6 (1964),
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(c) (1972).
34251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tean. 1966).
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plained by the prohibition of rule 23,3 5 the frustration of congressional purpose in
Title VII's procedural requirements,3 6 the lack of evidence indicating an available
job position for every member,37 the dislike of awarding large sums of money to a
class of unnamed plaintiffs,3 8 and the difficulty in determining the amount of money
to be awarded to each member of the class.30
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.40 was the first case to establish guidelines for
granting monetary relief to all members of a class. The court set forth two cri-
teria, one demanded by Title VII itself, the other by rule 23.4 1  First, the issues
in the suit must be those previously raised before the EEOC, and those which the
plaintiff has standing to raise. Secondly, the suit must meet the requirements es-
tablished by rule 23 for class action suits brought in federal courts. Although both
criteria are still adhered to in class action suits under Title VII, they are loosely
applied and rarely present a barrier for potential plaintiffs. The first requirement
was an effort to insure that the purpose of the Act, voluntary conciliation of dis-
putes through the mechanism of the EEOC, was maintained. 42 Today, however, a
complaint in federal court is not strictly limited to those issues raised before the
EEOC, but may allege any act of discrimination "like or reasonably related to the
allegation of the charge and growing out of such allegations." 43
The second requirement, that of compliance with rul: 23, merely recognized a
procedural rule which exists independently of Title VII. Rule 23 provides that an
action may be brought as a class action if certain enumerated tests are satisfied.
Rule 23(a) sets forth the basic criteria for any class, 44 while rule 23(b) imposes
additional requirements for various types of actions.45 Most class suits under Title
3 5 See, e.g., Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F. Supp, 1145, 1152-53 (E.D. Va.
1970); accord C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 312 (2d eal. 1970); .cee note 63 hdra.
30327 F. Supp. at 1153; see text at note 43 infra.
37 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 5 F.E.P. Cas. 421 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
3 8 Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 46 F.R.D. 49, 53 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
30 Williams v. American St. Gobain Corp., 1 F.E.P. Cas. 586 (E.D. Okla. 1968), disisnsed,
2 F.E.P. Cas. 331 (E.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd 447 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1971).
40 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
4 11 d. at 499.
42 Id.
43 Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971).
44 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides that the prerequisites for a class action are that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Class Action Maintainable.
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which should as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not parties to the
1032 [Vol, 85
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VII are filed under rule 23(b) (2), which provides that a class action may be main-
tained when a party has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, so that injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the entire class is
appropriate.
Despite the fact that compliance with rule 23(a) is a prerequisite to the main-
tenance of a class action suit, courts have often held that a suit complies with rule
23 without examining each requirement.40 The district court in Johnon stated
without elaboration that "it appears to this Court that plaintiff has satisfied the re-
quirements of Rule 23(a)." 47  In addition, the court held that the defendant had
obviously acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby justifying a
suit under rule 23 (b) (2). The court of appeals broadened the class to which relief
was given, not by re-examining the requirements of rule 23, but by defining dis-
crimination so as to reach a larger group.48
To consider racial discrimination suits proper class actions per se and to define
the protected class as all black employees whether or not they have been individ-
ually affected allows easy access to the courts, but has inherent dangers for both
unnamed plaintiffs and the defendant. Rule 23(a) provides procedural protec-
tions for both parties to a class action: class members must be represented ade-
quately and fairly and the defendant need only reply to the questions of law or fact
common to the class and brought by representative members of that class. 49 Fur-
ther protection provided in subsections of 23(b) is cued to the relief within each
subsection. The usually harmless absence of a notice requirement in rule 23(b) (2),
however, leaves a major gap in the protections afforded unnamed plaintiffs in a
Title VII class suit, since all members of a rule 23(b) (2) class are bound by the
adjudication or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest;
or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy....
46 In addition to the court's handling of Jobnson at both the district and appellate levels,
see Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
47 349 F. Supp. at 12.
48491 F.2d at 1372-73. The court of appeals broadened the class by reference to the
statistics on age and education achievement. See note 25 supra. A generous definition of the
class is typical of other courts: in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., note 46 supra, the plaintiffs own
suit was moot but he was deemed an adequate representative for other blacks at the plant,
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), a discharged
black was named the representative of all blacks subject to discriminatory practices by the
defendant. Courts usually construe the requirements of rule 23 liberally because they have
adequate opportunities later in the case to create subclasses, eliminate the class action aspect
of the suit, or otherwise modify its initial order. See Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D.
Va. 1970); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
-9 One extreme example of a situation in which the defendant was unprepared was pre-
sented in Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1971), in which an alline
stewardess was discharged under a no-marriage policy, and won her case for reinstatement and
back pay. The district court sua sponte retained jurisdiction to determine if the same relief
should apply to other stewardesses, even though no class was defined until after the judgment
had been rendered.
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decision, 5o and no member of the class may withdraw from the suit. In addi-
tion, the 23(b)(2) requirement of action or inaction by the defendant can be
satisfied even if the action or inaction affects only one or a few members of the class,
provided it is based on grounds which have general application to the class.51 Fur-
ther, there is no requirement in 23(b)(2) that common questions of law or fact
predominate over individual ones, as they must in a rule 23(b) (3) suit. 52 The
Johnson court's broadening of the class affected in a Title VII class action suit will
not result in the abuse of class members' rights when remedies are confined to
the typical 23(b) (2) relief of injunctions or declaratory judgments. But since
the relief granted under a Title VII class action suit typically includes mone-
tary awards in addition to injunctions against further discriminatory practices, 5 a
lack of notice to members of the plaintiff class may create a situation in which un-
named members may never learn of a settlement or judgment which provides a
back pay award to which they are entitled. 54
This result appears to conflict with rule 23(b)(3)'s purpose of providing ade-
quate protection for the parties concerned. 55 In actions brought under that subsec-
tion, plaintiffs must provide all class members with "the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort."'zo The Advisory Committee Notes state that
notice is "not merely discretionary," adding that "the mandatory notice . . . is de-
signed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action procedure
is of course subject."57  The recent Supreme Court decision in Eiren v. Carlisle ard
lacquelin5s confirmed the Committee's reading of the constitutional requirement
f6r notice in rule 23(b)(3) suits, 9 concluding that notice was not discretionary,
but "an unambiguous requirement of rule 23."GO Members of a rule 23(b)(3)
class, upon receiving notice, are also entitled to withdraw from the suit if they
wish to pursue their own remedies for damages.
50 A suit under rule 23(b)(2) does not give members of the class the chance to opt out of
the suit; therefore, issues litigated in the case are res judicata to all members of the class, 3B
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 5 23.31(3] (2d ed. 1969).
51 DVISORY COMMITTEE, NOTES ON AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE 23, 39 F,R.D.
98, 102 [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITrEE].
52Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) is available when the class does not fit within subsections
(b)(1) or (b)(2); see note 45 supra for full text.
,3 See text at IV infra.
54 The problems of pretrial notice and notification after the suit could be taken care of by
the district court. Ru!e 23(d) provides that the court has the discretion to order notice to
members of the class at any time during the action "'for the protction of the members of the
class." Further, the actual framing of the relief award could list each discriminatee entitled
to back pay if subpoenaed company records were carefully screened. In Johnion, however,
there is no indication in the district court opinion that such pretrial notice was ordered, al-
though the court of appeals did outline the potential class entitled to back pay. See note 63
infra.
55 See note 46 supra.
56 ADviSORY COMMITTEE at 106-07.
5T Id.
58417 U.S. 156 (1974).
59 Although the Supreme Court is construing the requirements of the language of the rule,
it examines them in light of the constitutional requirements of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
00 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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By contrast, actions under rule 23(b)(2) were intended to provide "final
relief of an injunctive nature .. settling the legality of the behavior with respect
to the class as a whole."6' 1 The Advisory Committee sav no need to include a
23(b) (3) requirement of notice to all class members in rule 23(b) (2) suits be-
cause such suits do not provide relief to class members as individuals. That is,
an injunction requiring a rule 23(b) (2) defendant to refrain from discriminatory
practices will presumably change the defendant's behavior toward the entire class,
whether or not the unnamed plaintiffs know that a judgment has been entered or
even that an action has been brought. Thus lack of notice to individual class mem-
bers would not jeopardize their subsequent fair treatment pursuant to such an in-
junction.
The expansion of rule 23(b) (2) remedies to include the monetary relief avail-
able under 23(b) (3) without the inclusion of corresponding notice requirements
may result in the deprivation of due process, since many of the considerations
which make notice a constitutional requirement in a 23(b) (3) suit apply to Title
VII suits under rule 23 (b) (2) as well. This unique problem posed by Title VII
judgments was recognized by Judge Gobold, who stated in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express that "an over-broad framing of a class may be so unfair to the ab-
sent members as to approach, if not amount to, a deprivation of due process."^
Other procedural problems may arise: barring members who did not receive
notice of an original 23 (b) (2) action from later suits for back pay would raise due
process problems, while attempting to avoid this due process problem by allowing
a multiplicity of suits would hinder the rule 23(b) (2) policy of unified disposi-
tion of a claim for all members of the class. Thus the practice of allowing back
pay awards under rule 23(b) (2) without the requirement of notice places two
important policies into potential conflict: the constitutional rights of unnamed
plaintiffs and the avoidance of multiple suits resulting from one class action.
In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. monetary relief was only one of
the remedies granted to the members of the class, which potentially included all
blacks hired before 1971 at Goodyear's Houston plant.0s Such back pay relief is
now frequently awarded and does provide needed compensation for victims of past
discrimination, but courts, concerned with providing full monetary compensation,
have not examined the problems involved in dispensing it. Johnson's expansion
of rule 23(b) (2) remedies to include mandatory back pay awards may provide
largely illusory relief unless rule 23(b) (2) is amended to provide for mandatory
notice when money damages are claimed. Such notice would also delineate the class
to whom the original action was res judicata, thus preventing multiple suits.
61 ADvIsORY COMMITEE at 102.
62 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (special con-
currence).
v The court of appeals established an outline of the class involved in the suit when it at-
tempted to set out some preliminary guidelines to aid the district court in fashioning its relief.
The court of appeals stated that the initial burden is on the employee to show that he is a mem-
ber of the recognized class subject to employment discrimination. The court thought that this
burden could be fulfilled by a showing of the individual employee that he was hired into the
Labor Department before April 22, 1971, and subsequently frozen there due to discriminatory
policies of Goodyear. Goodyear could refute this evidence of discrimination only by showing
that other factors would have prevented the employee's transfer regardless of any discrimina-
tory employment practices, and such proof must be clear and convincing. 491 F.2d at 1379-80.
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IV. CLASS-WIDE AWARD OF BACK PAY
A. The Mandatory Back Pay Reqairement
Johnson states that "where employment discrimination has been clearly demon-
strated, employees who have been victims of that discrimination must be compen-
sated if financial losses can be established."04 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, not
only states that back pay is an appropriate type of award for a class of victims of
past discrimination,6 5 but holds that such relief is mandatory to compensate for
economic loss. This result is required neither by the Act nor by rule 23(b)(2).
The language of the Act leaves the determination of the type of relief within the
discretion of the judge; the court "may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate." 06  Monetary relief is not required. Further, the Advisory Committe
Notes to rule 23 (b) (2) state that "the subdivision does not extend to cases in which
the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money dam-
ages."
07
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,08 the first case to award an entire rule 23(b)
(2) class an award of back pay, merely stated that all members of the class were
eligible for all forms of relief provided by Title VII.09 The first attempt to rec-
oncile the language of the Advisory Committee Notes and the practice of the
courts in awarding monetary relief in a 23(b)(2) suit occurred in Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp.,70 where the award of back pay was seen as only one element of a
total equitable relief, rather than a claim for damages, and hence was a part of the
relief contemplated by rule 23(b)(2). 71 This rationale has been adopted by other
courts in Title VII suits: the award of back pay as compensation for past economic
harm, traditionally a legal remedy, has been transformed into an equitable remedy.
One recent case went so far as to state that the requirements of rule 23(b) (2)
were only that the "conduct of the party opposing the class is such as makes such
equitable relief appropriate," 72 so that the form of equitable relief sought became
immaterial to the plaintiff class's qualification to maintain the various kinds of
action available under rule 23(b) (2). Hence the "final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief" mentioned by rule 23 (b) (2) as appropriate remedies
in actions brought under that subsection are not the sole remedies available to plain-
tiffs, but are only examples of the wide selection of equitable remedies plaintiffs
may seek under rule 23(b) (2).
Courts have been influenced in this characterization of back pay awards in
Title VII suits as an equitable remedy by the National Labor Relations Act
,04491 F.2d at 1375 (emphasis added).
O5See note 19 supra.
66 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1972).
67 ADvIsORY CoMMri'TEE at 102.
08416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
69Id. at 720-21.
70444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
71 Id. at 802. This principle was carried even further in Arkansas Educational Assn, v.
Bd. of Education, 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971), in which a suit was maintained under rule
23(b)(2) when injunctive relief was no longer necessary due to an intervening change in policy
by the defendant, leaving a claim for money damages as the only form of relief sought.
72 Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974).
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(NLRA). , ' The relief provisions of Title VII were modeled on similar provi-
sions of the NLRA,7a which states that a party engaged in discrimination should
"take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees, with or with-
out back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter." 73 Although the
wording of the provisions is similar, the framers of the NLRA were guided by
considerations inapplicable to Title VII class action suits: back pay may be awarded
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in its administrative proceedings,
whereas claims filed with the EEOC must be adjudicated in a federal court before
any such award can be made. The NLRA designation of back pay as equitable
reflects concern that awards characterized as "damages" 70 would be subject to a trial
de novo upon appeal from administrative agencies such as the NLRB because of
defendant employers' seventh amendment right to jury trial in "suits at common
law, where the value of the controversy shall exceed twenty dollars."- Hence the
framers of the NLRA were guided by the desire to resolve seventh amendment
constitutional conflicts, whereas courts faced with Title VII cases should limit their
concern to rule 23(b) (2)'s allowance of only certain types of equitable relief.
Therefore, despite the derivation of the relief provisions of Title VII from the
NLRA, the NLRB's classification of back pay as "equitable" should have no rele-
vance in determining what forms of relief may be granted in class action suits under
Title VII.
Besides using language from the NLRA to characterize back pay awards, courts
in Title VII class action suits have relied on standards developed in NLRB pro-
ceedings to determine the circumstances under which back pay awards may ap-
propriately be granted. The United States Supreme Court, through its study of
the legislative history of the NLRA, has concluded that although monetary awards
resemble compensation for private injury, such awards are "remedies created by
statute [which] vindicate public, not private rights."7 s The Court observed that
the award of back pay is not penal and should not be avoided by the Board of
Labor in fashioning its relief. 9  Courts hearing appeals from NLRB proceedings
have interpreted this holding of the Supreme Court by awarding back pay rou-
tinely; "the finding of an unfair labor practice and discriminatory discharge is pre-
sumptive proof that some back pay is owed by the employer."8
°
.3 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
74 For legislative history on the consideration of Title VII relief based on the NLRB model,
see 110 CoNG. REc. 6549 (1964). For cases which have recognized the influence of similar
NLRB decisions, see United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921 a. 19 (5th Cir.
1973); 491 F.2d at 1377 n. 37, 1380.
7529 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
G Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Committee on Education and Labor of the Senate, State.
ment by Robert Caldwell, *74th Cong. 1st Sess. 44546 (1935).
7 When this issue came before the Supreme Court, it stated that the seventh amendment
"has no application to cases where the recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable
relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at law.. NLRB Y. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937). Moreover, administrative proceedings such
as those provided for by the NLRA were unknown at the common law, and therefore did not
fall within the seventh amendment. Id. at 48-49.
8 Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 543 (1943).
;9 1d.
'" NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 972 (1966).
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This interpretation of a back pay award as a public remedy, has also been in-
corporated into Title VII discrimination suits. The Supreme Court spoke of the
public nature of suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,81
and lower courts have read this decision to approve of an NLRB-type interpreta-
tion of Title VII.82 Despite judicial approval of the use of back pay awards, no
language in the cases nor the law itself demands that the entire class be given back
pay as a remedy.
Johnson failed to take into account the unique procedural reasons for the
NLRB's characterization of back pay awards as equitable, and thus found in the
similarity of the relief provisions of the NLRA and Title VII, and in the NLRB's
custom of routinely awarding back pay, a mandate for back pay awards under
Title VII. The Johnson court fashioned its back pay mandate from several un-
sound theoretical bases: the definition of back pay as "equitable" injunctive and
declaratory relief within the meaning of rule 23(b) (2) was based on the Title VII
cases of Bowe and Robinson and the decisions of the NLRB, and the adoption of
a mandatory back pay standard was based on the use of inapplicable NLRB stan-
dards.
B. The Elimination of Previously Successful Title VII Defenses
The Johnson court not only removed the element of judicial discretion from
the award of back pay to members of a class, but also eliminated many potential
defenses that had been successful before other courts. Goodyear argued that it
had made good faith efforts to eliminate effects of past discrimination, and that due
to the unsettled state of the law, its actions were not clearly discriminatory at the
time they were committed.8 3 Both these defenses had been successful before. A
district court refused to award back pay in Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refinhig Co,84
where the employer had made good faith efforts to eliminate effects of pre-Act
segregation. In United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railay Co.,85 the Eighth
Circuit denied a back pay award, stating that the employer had not acted in bad
faith in declining to implement the government's proposed merger of jobs. Simi.
larly, in United States v. N. L. Industries,0 the Eighth Circuit observed, "In this
Circuit the law has in regard to back pay not been adequately defined to provide
employers and unions with notice that they will be liable for a discriminatee's
economic losses due to a continuance of past or present discriminatory policies."87
The Johnson court rejected both defenses by reference to decisions under the
NLRB: "Good faith and detrimental reliance have similarly been rejected as an
affirmative defense when balancing the equities in awarding damages in other areas
of labor law."88 The court stated that all employers had been on notice of the
81 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
82 Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968); 491 F.2d at 1377
n. 37.
83 491 F.2d at 1374.
8 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
85 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972).
88 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
871 d. at 380.
88491 F.2d at 1377 n. 37. The only possible defense that the Johnjon court would con.
sider admitting was that the discriminatory practices were in compliance with a "protective"
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requirements of Title VII since its effective date in 1965. Goodyear pointed
out that the scope of the Title VII mandate was not established until Griggs,99 so
that its requirements could not have been known, understood, or compiled with
until five years after its effective date. Nevertheless, the court rejected defenses
of reliance and good faith, stating that "Title VII is strong medicine and we re-
fuse to vitiate its potency.' '9 This rejection of most of the defenses previously
available in Title VII suits almost insures that a back pay award must be granted
once a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. Pettway v. Amer-
ican Cast Iron Pipe Co.,91 a Fifth Circuit case applying the guidelines of Johnson,
has carried forward this restrictive interpretation to conclude that discretion to deny
back pay is narrow, so that back pay should normally be awarded unless special
circumstances are present.92
Johnson's guidelines are not in keeping with the traditional role of courts in
shaping equitable relief. Courts responsible for creating remedies which take all
the peculiar facts of each situation into consideration have previously used wide
discretion in fashioning the final relief given. 3 Goodyear's discarded but merito-
rious defenses, successful in earlier Title VII suits, should be one of those ele-
ments which shape the ultimate equitable award. Johnson appears to provide, if it
does not say explicitly, that the only available alternatives with respect to back pay
in Title VII suits are to withhold back pay awards altogether or to award an
amount compensating plaintiffs for all economic losses suffered since the effective
date of the Act; the Act states that the choice of remedies should be limited only
by what provides appropriate relief in each case.94
V. CONCLUSION
Title VII was passed in 1964 to eliminate historical patterns of racial discrim-
ination and to provide relief for its victims. The class action suit is one of the
most effective methods to gain relief for those entitled to protection under Title
VII, in that one member of the class may bring suit for all. In addition, class
suits fulfill the public purposes of the Act by ending employment discrimination
for all employees of the defendant as well as compensating all aggrieved employ-
ees. Back pay is an important element of such relief, the most important remedy
which may be given for past years of discrimination and economic loss.
The pattern of awarding back pay as developed by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson
and other circuits raises two major problems, however. First, rule 23 (b) (2) is not
designed to provide the relief granted in a typical Title VII suit, but was intended
to provide injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief: therefore it provides
no protections for members of the class as individuals. Even if monetary relief
state statute. 491 F.2d at 1377. This principle was established in LeBlinc v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
89401 U.S. 424 (1970).
90 491 F.2d at 1377.
91 494 F.2d 211 <5th Cir. 1974).
92 Id. at 252-53.
95 The court of appeals even acknowledged that the trial court's dose contact with the
parties in the trial gave it a special advantage in fashioning an equitable decree. 491 F.2d at
1380.
94See text at note 18 supra.
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is labeled a part of total equitable relief rather than damages, such monetary awards
nonetheless create a conflict between procedural due process for the plaintiffs and
the rule 23 policy of prevention of a multiplicity of suits. Given the prevalence
of 23(b) (2) suits filed under Title VII, courts should devote some attention to this
conflict. One possible solution would be the filing of the back pay claim separate-
ly under rule 23(b) (3). Although such filing would protect potential members
of the class through the notice requirements of rule 23(b) (3), it would pose other
problems in light of a recent Supreme Court decision on the use of this subsec-
tion.95 The alternative is a special statutory provision for Title VII suits, formu.
lated either within Title VII itself or by a special rule within the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to provide for mandatory notice in Title VII suits for back
pay.96 The other problem in the granting of monetary damages under Title VII
is the continual narrowing of judicial discretion in the fashioning of the equi-
table relief given. Although this practice is not an infringement of a constitution-
al right, it does conflict with the traditional power of a judge to take into account
all aspects of the case in his final decree. The result of this practice has been to
make an award of back pay a foregone conclusion once economic discrimination is
shown, despite the fact that the application of the Griggs definition of discrimi-
nation to acts committed in the five years before its formulation results in harsh
judgments against even well-meaning employers. One commentator has stated,
"It can, in fact, be accurately observed that Title VII is rapidly becoming another
F.E.L.A."g7
Courts have sought to end employment discrimimination by expanding the
right of class action and the relief given. In their provision of full relief to vic-
tims of past discrimination, however, they have largely overlooked problems in
the methods used. Courts should pause to examine more carefully the principles
of class action suits and remedies given before proceeding in the pattern of Johnson
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
L. Diane Schenke
9-Zaha v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (each member named and
unnamed in a rule 23(b)(3) suit mu.,t meet the jurisdictional amount); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (each unnamed member of the class whose identity can
be ascertained must be notified by mail at the representative plaintiff's expense); Note, Un.
named Plaintiffs in Federal Class Actions: Zahn v. International Paper Co. Further Reitricis
the Availability of the Class Suit, 35 Onto ST. L.J. 190 (1974).
06E.g., a Title VII equivalent to rule 23.1, which governs derivative actions by share.
holders.
90 Gardner, The Development of the Substantive Principles of Title VII Law: The De-
fendant's View, 26 ALA. L. REV. 1, 104 (1973).
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